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The	  Promise,	  the	  Challenge,	  of	  Everyday	  Aesthetics	  
Jane	  Forsey	  
The	   contemporary	  movement	   of	   Everyday	   Aesthetics	   shows	   great	   promise	   for	   expanding	  
the	  focus	  of	  the	  discipline	  from	  its	  historical	  preoccupations	  with	  fine	  art	  and	  natural	  beauty	  
to	   include	  objects	  and	  activities	  that	   it	  has	  heretofore	  neglected:	  sofas,	  knives	  and	  coffee-­‐
pots	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  cooking,	  walking	  to	  work	  or	  going	  to	  a	  ballgame	  on	  the	  other.	  My	  
work	   on	   the	   aesthetics	   of	   design	   offers	   a	  modest	   contribution	   to	   this	   expanded	   scope	   of	  
concern.	  But	  expanding	  the	  range	  of	  objects	  and	  activities	  fit	  for	  aesthetic	  attention	  brings	  
with	  it	  the	  question	  of	  how	  exactly	  these	  phenomena	  should	  be	  treated:	  	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  
challenges	   the	   new	  movement	   faces	   is	   to	   conceptualize	   how	  we	   respond	   aesthetically	   to	  
ordinary	  things.	  
On	   the	  one	  hand,	  when	  we	  appreciate	  a	   sofa	  or	  ballgame	  –	  when	  we	  subject	   it	   to	  our	  
theoretical	  gaze	  –	  we	  also	  seem	  to	  lift	  it	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  ordinary	  and	  everyday	  to	  that	  
of	  the	  unusual	  or	  striking.	  That	   is,	  to	  make	  such	  a	  thing	  fit	  for	  our	  aesthetic	  attention	  is	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  to	  make	  it	  somehow	  extraordinary,	  and	  this	  seems	  to	  rob	  it	  of	  the	  very	  eve-­‐
rydayness	  that	  the	  movement	  has	  been	  striving	  to	  focus	  on.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   if	  we	  em-­‐
phasize	   the	  mundane	  and	  ordinary	  nature	  of	  daily	  phenomena,	   it	  becomes	  difficult	   to	  ex-­‐
plain	  why	  they	  would	  capture	  our	  aesthetic	  attention	  at	  all.	  	  
Recent	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  Everyday	  Aesthetics	  are	  roughly	  divided	  by	  how	  
theorists	  have	  responded	  to	  this	  challenge.	  For	  example,	  what	  Chris	  Dowling	  has	  called	  the	  
“weak	   formulation”	   of	   Everyday	   Aesthetics	   claims	   that	   «the	   concept	   of	   the	   aesthetic	   at	  
work	   in	  discussions	  of	   the	   value	  of	   art	   can	  be	  extended	   to	   include	   experiences	   from	  daily	  
life»	   (Dowling	   [2010]:	  241).	  Dowling	  cites	  Roger	  Scruton	  and	  Sherri	   Irvin	  as	  also	  defending	  
this	  view,	  but	  its	  most	  recent	  proponent	  is	  Tom	  Leddy,	  who	  in	  his	  2012	  work	  The	  Extraordi-­‐
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nary	  in	  the	  Ordinary	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  «approach	  the	  ordinariness	  of	  the	  ordi-­‐
nary	  without	  making	  it	  extraordinary,	  without	  approaching	  it,	  therefore,	  in	  an	  art-­‐like	  way»	  
(Leddy	  [2012]:	  121).	  By	  contrast,	  the	  “strong	  formulation”	  holds	  that	  «experiences	  from	  dai-­‐
ly	   life	   can	   afford	   paradigm	   instances	   of	   aesthetic	   experience.	   Such	   experiences	   are	   not	  
bound	  by	  the	  limitations	  and	  conventions	  that	  temper	  discussions	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  in	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  art»	  (Dowling	  [2010]:241).	  The	  strong	  view	  can	  be	  identified	  with	  Yuriko	  Saito	  
and	  Arto	  Haapala	  in	  particular.	  
What	  emerges	   in	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  weak	  and	  strong	  views	  is	  a	  disagreement	  
about	  the	  appropriate	  methodology	  for	  the	  movement,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  represents	  a	  pressing	  
issue.	  Either	  Everyday	  Aesthetics	  merely	  extends	  the	  range	  of	  objects	  fit	  for	  aesthetic	  atten-­‐
tion	  while	  maintaining	  familiar	  theoretical	  models	  and	  concepts,	  or	  the	  movement	  demands	  
a	   reconfiguration	  of	   our	   understanding	  of	   aesthetic	   experience	   as	   prompted	  by	  quotidian	  
phenomena.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  consider	  both	  attempts	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  challenge	  that	  the	  
everyday	  poses	  and	  find	  both	  inadequate	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  presented.	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  
the	  aesthetic	  experience	  of	  design	  as	  I	  have	  conceived	  it	  may	  provide	  a	  direction	  for	  a	  more	  
fully	  conceptualized	  theory	  of	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  everyday.	  But	  let	  me	  begin	  with	  the	  cri-­‐
tique.	  
1.	  The	  Weak	  Formulation	  
The	  weak	  view	  can	  be	  superficially	  characterized	  as	  the	  uncritical	  application	  of	  already	  es-­‐
tablished	  aesthetic	  theory	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  new	  objects	  and	  as	  simply	  bickering	  about	  which	  
ones	  to	  include	  in	  the	  category	  of	  the	  aesthetic:	  	  itches	  and	  scratches	  (cfr.	  Irvin	  [2008]);	  the	  
tucking	  in	  of	  a	  shirt	  or	  the	  art	  of	  wardrobe	  more	  generally	  (cfr.	  Melchionne	  [2011]);	  stand-­‐
ard	   concepts	   such	  as	  beauty	  and	  gracefulness	  or	   their	  extension	   to	   include	  “nice”	   “shiny”	  
and	   “fun”(cfr.	   Leddy	   [2012]).	  However,	   this	   characterization	  belies	   a	  methodological	   posi-­‐
tion	  that	  is	  both	  more	  complex	  and	  more	  problematic	  for	  it	  takes	  a	  stand	  on	  what	  aesthetic	  
experience	  amounts	   to,	   and	   takes	   as	   its	  model	   the	   appreciation	  of	   fine	   art.	   	   For	  Dowling,	  
Leddy	  and	  others,	  an	  aesthetic	  experience	  is	  prompted	  by	  an	  object	  standing	  out	  from	  the	  
flow	   of	   ordinary	   perception,	   and	   demanding	   our	   notice	   as	   being	   unusual	   or	   unfamiliar	   in	  
some	  way.	  I	  call	  this	  the	  “extraordinarist”	  stance,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  new:	  from	  Kant	  onward,	  aes-­‐
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thetic	  experience	  has	  been	  characterized	  as	  being	   importantly	  different	   from	  the	  ordinary	  
perceptual,	  cognitive	  or	  moral	  relations	  we	  have	  to	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  	  
The	  weak	   formulation’s	   extraordinarist	   position	   is	   not	   its	   only	   stance:	   it	   further	   claims	  
that	  our	  appraisal	  of	  the	  everyday	  must	  be	  modelled	  on	  our	  experience	  of	  fine	  art.	  We	  see	  
this	  in	  the	  “therefore”	  of	  Leddy’s	  earlier	  assertion.	  But	  approaching	  the	  ordinary	  as	  extraor-­‐
dinary	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  we	  treat	  it	  as	  fine	  art.	  	  For	  Kant	  in	  particular,	  the	  beauty	  and	  sub-­‐
limity	   of	   nature	   provide	   striking	   experiences	   while	   also	   being	   importantly	   different	   from	  
works	  of	  art.	  	  By	  making	  this	  further	  move,	  and	  adopting	  the	  model	  of	  the	  fine	  arts	  for	  eve-­‐
ryday	  objects,	  theorists	  of	  the	  weak	  formulation	  make	  what	  amounts	  to	  a	  category	  mistake	  
between	  works	  of	  art	  and,	   to	  use	  Danto’s	  phrase	   (1981),	  «mere	   real	   things».	   	   In	  doing	   so	  
they	  not	  only	  undermine	  the	  initial	  impetus	  of	  the	  movement	  but	  they	  distinctly	  narrow	  our	  
conception	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  in	  general.	  	  	  
A	   critique	   of	   the	   weak	   formulation	   requires	   that	   we	   counter	   each	   of	   these	   separate	  
stances	  and	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  second.	  Following	  Robert	  Stecker,	  I	  will	  make	  a	  distinction	  
between	  artistic	  and	  aesthetic	  value,	  and	  argue	   that	  as	  everyday	  objects	  are	  not	  works	  of	  
art,	   they	   carry	   no	   artistic	   value,	   although	   they	   may	   have	   aesthetic	   value.	   	   As	   such,	   they	  
ought	  not	  be	  approached	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  works	  of	  art.	   	  While	  this	  argument	  will	  not	  un-­‐
dermine	  the	  weak	  view	  altogether,	  it	  will	  make	  room	  for	  taking	  the	  strong	  view	  more	  seri-­‐
ously.	  For	  Everyday	  Aesthetics	  began	  by	  seeking	  the	  inclusion	  in	  philosophical	  aesthetics	  of	  
objects	  and	  activities	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  nature	  (to	  be	  appreciated	  as	  natural	  beauty	  or	  sub-­‐
limity	  might	  be)	  and	  if	  they	  are	  also	  not	  works	  of	  art,	  or	  akin	  to	  works	  of	  art,	  then	  perhaps	  
an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	   is	  precisely	  what	   is	  needed	  to	  give	  them	  
their	  due.	  That	  is,	  without	  the	  model	  of	  fine	  art,	  there	  may	  be	  no	  extraordinarist	  model	  left	  
for	  proponents	  of	   the	  weak	   formulation	   to	   rely	  on.	   	  And	   this	  opens	   the	  way	   for	  everyday	  
phenomena	   to	  provide	   the	  paradigm	   for	  aesthetic	  experience	   that	   the	   strong	   formulation	  
seeks	  to	  provide.	  	  But	  let	  me	  first	  say	  a	  little	  more	  about	  the	  weak	  view	  itself.	  
While	  a	  number	  of	   theorists	  share	   the	   intuitions	  of	   the	  weak	   formulation,	   this	   is	  by	  no	  
means	  a	  homogeneous	  approach.	   For	   instance,	   there	   is	  disagreement	  about	  what	  objects	  
are	  appropriate	  for	  our	  attention.	   Irvin,	   in	  her	  depiction	  of	   itching,	  scratching	  and	  drinking	  
coffee	  believes	  these	  actions	  can	  be	  rendered	  «quietly	  exquisite	  and	  even	  strangely	  foreign	  
when	  done	  with	  full	  attention»	  (Irvin	  [2008]:31).	  For	  Dowling	  and	  Brian	  Soucek,	  this	   is	  not	  
sufficient.	  Dowling	  argues	  that	  the	  “core”	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  is	  its	  «normative	  aspect»	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that	   «legitimately	   engage[s]	   critical	   attention	   and	   interest»	   (Dowling	   [2010]:	   240,	   229).	  
Drawing	  on	  Kant’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  agreeable	  and	  the	  beautiful,	  Dowling	  claims	  that	  
in	   judgements	  of	   the	   latter	   the	  emphasis	   is	  on	  «common	  and	  communicable	  experiences»	  
rather	  than	  reports	  about	  «one’s	  private	  subjective	  responses»	  (Dowling	  [2010]:	  237).	  And	  
Soucek	  states	  quite	  bluntly	  that	  «[l]acking	  an	  object	  that	  is	  at	   least	   in	  principle	  publicly	  ac-­‐
cessible,	  one	  simply	  lacks	  an	  aesthetic	  experience»	  (Soucek	  [2009]:	  225),	  thus	  excluding	  so-­‐
matic	  pleasures	  and	  private	  states	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  aesthetic.	  
In	  spite	  of	  these	  differences,	  though,	  theorists	  of	  the	  weak	  view	  share	  similar	  accounts	  of	  
the	  broad	  nature	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  itself.	  	  Irvin	  adopts	  Robert	  Stecker’s	  “minimal	  con-­‐
ception”	   where	   aesthetic	   experience	   is	   «the	   experience	   of	   attending	   in	   a	   discriminating	  
manner	  to	  forms,	  qualities	  or	  meaningful	  features	  of	  things,	  attending	  to	  these	  for	  their	  own	  
sake	  or	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  very	  experience»	  (Irvin	  [2008]:27).	  It	  is	  essential,	  Irvin	  notes,	  that	  
the	  experience	  «be	  accompanied	  by	  an	  evaluation»	  and	  cites	  Stecker’s	  claim	  that	  «one	  does	  
not	   have	   such	   experiences	   without	   one	   valuing	   them	   in	   one	   way	   or	   another»	   (Irvin	  
[2008]:27).	  Irvin,	  moreover,	  agrees	  with	  Soucek	  that	  these	  evaluations	  need	  to	  be	  objective	  
and	  subject	  to	  norms	  (Soucek	  [2009]:	  29),	  even	  though	  she	  asserts	  that	  they	  can	  be	  applied	  
to	  private	  sensations.	  	  And	  Dowling,	  in	  his	  reliance	  on	  Kant,	  conceives	  aesthetic	  experience	  
in	  a	  similar	  way,	  as	  involving	  a	  normative	  judgement	  about	  the	  mere	  appearance	  of	  a	  thing,	  
made	   for	   its	   own	   sake	   without	   any	   attendant	   inclination	   or	   desire	   (Dowling	   [2010]:228).	  
Their	  methodology	   for	   the	   appreciation	   of	   the	   everyday	   (whatever	   this	   category	   is	   to	   in-­‐
clude)	  thus	  proceeds	  upon	  a	  fairly	  stable	  and	  conventional	  view	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	   in	  
general,	  as	  including	  a	  normative	  and	  objective	  judgement	  about	  an	  object	  that	  is	  perhaps	  
attended	  by	  pleasure	  of	  a	  certain	  (disinterested)	  kind.	  This	  experience	  renders	  an	  object	  ex-­‐
traordinary	   in	   that	   it	   becomes	   separated	   from	   the	   flow	  of	   our	   experiences	   and	   concerns,	  
and	  is	  appraised	  for	   its	  own	  sake;	  an	  appraisal	  that	   is	  unlike	  other	  forms	  of	   judgement	  we	  
might	  make.	  
Turning	  specifically	  to	  the	  art-­‐like	  nature	  of	  these	  experiences,	  Leddy’s	  recent	  work	  pro-­‐
vides	  its	  clearest	  articulation.	  While	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  everyday	  objects	  are	  not	  works	  of	  
art,	   they	  nevertheless	  «can	  be	  aesthetically	  appreciated	  by	  way	  of	  perceiving	   through	   the	  
eyes	  of	  an	  artist»	  because	  artists	  are	  «the	   true	  experts	   in	   the	  aesthetics	  of	  everyday	   life»	  
(Leddy	  [2012]:	  114,	  99).	  Leddy’s	  position	  is	  that	  the	  ordinary	  «is	  uninteresting	  or	  boring	  and	  
only	  becomes	  aesthetic	  when	   transformed»	   (Leddy	   [2012]:	  112)	  and	  he	  effects	   this	   trans-­‐
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formation	  through	  his	  conception	  of	  “aura”.	  	  Aura	  is	  not	  an	  aesthetic	  property	  per	  se	  but	  an	  
experience	  of	  an	  object	  as	  «having	  the	  quality	  of	  heightened	  significance	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  
to	  extend	  beyond	  itself»	  (Leddy	  [2012]:	  116-­‐7).	  	  It	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  characteristic	  of	  an	  
object	  as	   experienced,	   in	  an	   intensified	  and	  art-­‐like	  way.	  This	  experience	   is	  attended	  with	  
pleasure;	  requires	  «imaginative	  perception»;	  and	  what	  he	  calls	  an	  «aesthetic	  attitude»	  or	  a	  
«sensing	  in	  a	  certain	  way»	  (Leddy	  [2012]:	  128-­‐31).	  	  	  
What	   Leddy	   (and	  more	   implicitly	  Dowling	   and	   Irvin)	   trade	   on	   is	   a	   view	  of	   art	   as	   being	  
somehow	  meaningful	  or	  profound,	  and	  they	  seek	  to	  extend	  this	  view	  to	  our	  experiences	  of	  
the	  mundane	  objects	  and	  activities	   that	  make	  up	  our	  everyday	   lives.	  Only	  by	  attending	   to	  
the	   ordinary	   in	   this	   intensified	  way	   can	   our	   experiences	   be	   called	   truly	   aesthetic.	   In	   this,	  
they	   also	   echo	  Paul	   Ziff’s	  much	  earlier	   claim	   that	   «[n]ot	   everything	  has	  meaning	  but	   any-­‐
thing	  can	  be	  given	  meaning»	  (Ziff	  [1997]:	  28),	  and	  giving	  meaning	  to	  quotidian	  phenomena	  
appears	  to	  be	  the	  final	  condition	  for	  experiencing	  them	  aesthetically.	  	  
Whether	  or	  not	  this	  view	  of	  art	  is	  correct	  –	  and	  I	  will	  accept	  a	  broad	  construal	  of	  it	  here	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  –	  it	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  the	  everyday	  that	  immedi-­‐
ately	  concerns	  me.	   	  For	   the	  weak	  view	  seems	   to	   suggest	   that	  my	  experience	  of	  a	  bowl	  of	  
peaches	  on	  my	  dining	  room	  table,	  to	  be	  aesthetic,	  must	  not	  only	  involve	  a	  normative	  evalu-­‐
ation,	  but	  be	  qualitatively	  similar	  to,	  say,	  that	  of	  a	  still	  life	  of	  a	  bowl	  of	  peaches	  by	  Chardin	  
or	   Cézanne:	   	   what	   each	  means	  may	   differ	   but	   all	   three	   carry	  meaning,	   and	   experiencing	  
them	  as	  significant	  is	  paradigmatic	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  at	  large.	  	  Leddy	  invokes	  the	  aes-­‐
thete	   and	   the	   flâneur	   as	   exemplars	   for	   the	   appreciator	  of	   the	  everyday:	   «[s]uch	   a	  person	  
seeks	  to	  see	  the	  world	  with	  the	  eyes	  of	  an	  artist»	  (Leddy	  [2012]:	  260),	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  
only	  by	  adopting	   this	   stance	  can	   the	  ordinary	  objects	  and	  activities	  of	  our	  daily	   lives	  have	  
any	  kind	  of	  aesthetic	  dimension.	  
These	  further	  claims	  strike	  me	  as	  patently	  false:	  	  an	  ordinary	  bowl	  of	  peaches	  need	  not	  
be	  meaningful	  to	  be	  beautiful,	  and	  my	  experience	  of	  it	  need	  not	  be	  profound	  in	  order	  to	  al-­‐
so	  be	  aesthetic.	   	   I	  will	   counter	   this	  art-­‐centred	  model	  by	  elaborating	  on	  Stecker’s	  minimal	  
conception	   of	   aesthetic	   experience	   before	   returning	   to	   problems	   with	   an	   extraordinarist	  
view	  more	  generally.	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2.	  Aesthetic	  and	  Artistic	  Value	  
As	  Irvin	  mentioned,	  for	  Stecker	  aesthetic	  experience	  at	  minimum	  involves	  an	  act	  of	  evalua-­‐
tion,	  or	  a	  judgement	  about	  the	  object	  presented	  to	  us.	  It	  also	  involves	  a	  valuing	  of	  that	  ex-­‐
perience	   itself,	  when	  we	  attend	   to	   the	  object	   “for	   its	  own	   sake”.	  But	   Stecker’s	  position	   is	  
more	  complex	  than	  Irvin	  presents.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  «experiences	  are	  not	  the	  only	  things	  that	  
have	  aesthetic	   value.	  The	  objects	  of	   those	  experiences	  have	  aesthetic	   value	   too»	   (Stecker	  
[2013]:	  3).	  We	  attribute	  value	  to	  the	  object	  when	  we	  «perceive	  and/or	  believe»	  that	  it	  pos-­‐
sesses	  «forms,	  qualities	  and	  meanings»	  (Stecker	  [2013]:	  3).	  	  That	  is,	  we	  assert	  the	  presence	  
of	  aesthetic	  value	  when	  we	  make	  a	  judgement	  about	  a	  given	  object	  –	  ie.	  that	  it	  is	  beautiful	  
or	   sublime	  and	  so	  on.	  This	   is	  what	  makes	  aesthetic	  experience	  «object-­‐oriented»	   (Stecker	  
[2006]:	  2,	  4).	  
Stecker’s	  work	  over	  several	  essays	  focuses	  on	  value	  rather	  than	  experience	  (although	  he	  
holds	   that	   the	   former	   is	  grounded	   in	   the	   latter)	  and	  he	  discerns	  aesthetic	  value	   to	  have	  a	  
number	  of	  elements.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  autonomous	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  intrinsic,	  or	  valued	  for	  its	  
own	   sake.	   	   It	   is	   also	   autonomous	   in	   another	   sense,	   in	   that	   it	   is	   «not	   defined	   by,	   derived	  
from,	  or	  […]	  a	  function	  of	  other	  values»	  (Stecker	  [2013]:	  1):	  it	  is	  sui	  generis.	  Second,	  aesthet-­‐
ic	  value	  need	  not	  be	  positive	  or	  experienced	  as	  pleasurable:	  we	  can	  be	  shocked	  or	  dismayed	  
while	  still	  valuing	  the	  experience	  or	  the	  object	  in	  question.	  Appreciation,	  then,	  «can	  be	  both	  
positive	   and	  negative»	   (Stecker	   [2006]:	   2,	   5).	   Third,	   aesthetic	   value	  «can	  be	   found	  almost	  
anywhere,	   in	   artworks	   and	   natural	   objects,	   but	   also	   in	   many	   everyday	   things»	   (Stecker	  
[2006]:	   1).	   It	   is	   «independent	   from	   other	   values	   and	   of	   the	   type	   of	   object	   experienced»	  
(Stecker	   [2013]:	  4).	   Finally,	   as	   Irvin	  notes,	   Stecker’s	   account	   is	  disjunctive:	   forms,	  qualities	  
and	  meanings	  need	  not	  all	  be	  perceived	  as	  present	   for	  us	   to	  make	  an	  assertion	  of	  an	  ob-­‐
ject’s	  having	  aesthetic	  value	  (Irvin	  [2008]:	  27).	  
Putting	  these	  elements	  together,	  Stecker	  claims	  that	  aesthetic	  value	  «is	  not	  derived	  from	  
any	   institution	  or	  practice.	   It	   is	  everywhere.	   It	  has	  to	  be	  defined	   in	   its	  own	  right	  […].	   	  Aes-­‐
thetic	  value	  can	  be	  realized	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  different	  media,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  different	  
value	  in	  different	  media»	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  361).	  
Stecker	  makes	  these	  assertions	  without	  taking	  either	  a	  realist	  or	  anti-­‐realist	  stand	  about	  
the	  ontological	  status	  of	  this	  value.	  It	  is	  enough,	  for	  him,	  if	  we	  can	  distinguish	  it	  from	  other	  
values,	  such	  as	  cognitive,	  hedonic	  or	  moral	  values,	  and	  understand	  aesthetic	  experience	  as	  
Jane	  Forsey,	  The	  Promise,	  the	  Challenge,	  of	  Everyday	  Aesthetics	  
pag.	  11	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2014	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466	  
an	   experience	   of	   this	   particular	   kind	   of	   value	   (Stecker	   [2012]:	   361;	   [2013]:	   	   5,	   9).	  On	   this	  
view,	  the	  aesthetic	  value	  of	  my	  bowl	  of	  peaches	  could	  indeed	  be	  coincident	  with	  the	  value	  
of	  Chardin’s	  Basket	  of	  Peaches	  with	  Walnuts,	  Knife	  and	  Glass	  of	  Wine	  (1768),	  or	  Cézanne’s	  
Dish	   of	   Peaches	   (1890-­‐1894),	   provided	   that	   I	   have	   had	   a	   similar	   aesthetic	   experience	   of	  
each,	  and	  assert	   that	  all	   three	  are,	   for	   instance,	  beautiful.	  But	  Stecker’s	  goal	   in	  describing	  
aesthetic	  value	  in	  such	  broad	  terms	  is	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  a	  further	  kind	  of	  value	  that	  only	  
artworks	  possess	  –	  artistic	  value	  –	  that	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  everyday	  things.	  
By	  artistic	  value,	  Stecker	   refers	   to	  «a	   type	  of	  value	  not	   identical	  with,	  but	   that	  may	   in-­‐
clude,	  aesthetic	  value»	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  355).	  He	  provides	  two	  main	  reasons	  for	  holding	  that	  
there	  is	  such	  a	  value.	  	  The	  first	  he	  claims	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  appearance	  of	  “anti-­‐aesthetic”	  
art	   (or	   “anti-­‐art”),	   from	  Dada	   through	  conceptual	  art,	   to	  various	  other	  avant-­‐garde	   forms.	  
These	  works	  «lack	  aesthetic	  value,	  or	  lack	  sufficient	  aesthetic	  value	  to	  explain	  their	  value	  as	  
art»	  yet	  they	  do	  have	  significant	  value	  as	  art:	  	  «it	  follows	  that	  there	  is	  nonaesthetic	  artistic	  
value»	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  356).	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  typically	  when	  interacting	  with	  art-­‐
works	  as	  viewers	  or	  critics,	  we	  value	  more	  than	  their	  aesthetic	  properties,	  even	  if	  they	  have	  
a	   high	   degree	   of	   aesthetic	   value.	   Art	   «is	   valued	   as	   an	   object	   of	   interpretation:	   it	   has	   art-­‐
historical	  value	  as	  well	  as	  cognitive	  and	  ethical	  value».	  And	  valuing	  artworks	  in	  these	  further	  
ways	  just	   is	  «responding	  to	  them	  as	  art»	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  356).	  Hence,	  there	  is	  again	  good	  
reason	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  nonaesthetic	  artistic	  value.	  
While	  Stecker	   is	  cautious	  about	  attempts	  to	  define	  artistic	  value,	  he	  does	  go	  some	  way	  
towards	  specifying	   its	  characteristics.	  First,	   it	   is	  heteronymous	   in	  that	   it	   is	  «derived	  from	  a	  
plurality	   of	  more	   basic	   values»	   (Stecker	   [2013]:	   4)	   such	   as	   the	   cognitive,	   ethical	   and	   art-­‐
historical	  values	  mentioned	  above.	  Second,	   its	  determination	  must	  be	  non-­‐essentialist	  be-­‐
cause,	  while	  a	  number	  of	  values	  can	  be	  artistic	  values,	  «what	  is	  an	  artistic	  value	  will	  not	  be	  
uniform	  across	  all	  artworks»	  or	  all	  times	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  359).	  Third,	  determining	  the	  artis-­‐
tic	  value	  of	  a	  given	  work	  «requires	  understanding	  what	  the	  artist	  who	  makes	  the	  work	  is	  in-­‐
tending	  to	  do	  in	  it»:	  	  this	  value,	  rather	  than	  being	  sui	  generis,	  «arise[s]	  within	  artistic	  tradi-­‐
tions	  or	  practices»	  (Stecker	  [2013]:	  4).	  Artworks	  have	  instrumental	  rather	  than	  intrinsic	  val-­‐
ue	  as	  «objects	  capable	  of	  delivering	  aesthetic	  experience	  to	  those	  who	  understand	  them»	  
(Stecker	  [2006]:	  5)	  but	  understanding	  them	  is	  essential	  to	  our	  appreciation.	  
By	  understanding	  the	  work,	  Stecker	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  means	  interpreting	  it,	  and	  in	  particu-­‐
lar	  interpreting	  it	  for	  meaning,	  thus	  emphasizing	  only	  one	  of	  the	  terms	  from	  his	  earlier	  dis-­‐
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junctive	  account	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  in	  general.	  «This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  discovering	  what	  an	  
artist	  does	   in	  a	  work,	  usually	   […]	  as	  a	   result	  of	   intending	   to	  do	   just	   that»	   (Stecker	   [2012]:	  
357).	  Understanding	   the	  work	   is	   a	   key	  method	   for	  distinguishing	  artistic	   value	   from	  other	  
adventitious	  values	  it	  might	  also	  have.	  For	  example,	  a	  painting’s	  financial	  value,	  or	  its	  value	  
as	  covering	  a	  hole	   in	  the	  wall	  can	  be	  discerned	  without	  understanding	  the	  work	   itself.	  But	  
the	   various	   values	   relevant	   to	   the	   artwork	  qua	   art	   arise	   because	   «imbuing	   the	  work	  with	  
such	  a	  value	  is	  part	  of	  the	  artist’s	  project	  in	  making	  the	  work	  and	  appreciating	  the	  value	  re-­‐
quires	  understanding	   the	  work»	   (Stecker	   [2012]:	  360).	  Noël	  Carroll,	   in	  a	  different	   context,	  
has	  likened	  this	  experience	  to	  an	  “I/Thou	  relation”	  (Carroll	  [2004]:	  285),	  where	  our	  interac-­‐
tion	  with	  art	  «is	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  conversation	  between	  the	  artist	  and	  us	  –	  a	  human	  en-­‐
counter	  –	   in	  which	  we	  have	  a	  desire	   to	  know	  what	   the	  artist	   intends»	   in	  part	  because	  we	  
wish	  to	  be	  a	  «capable	  respondent»	  in	  this	  conversation	  (Carroll	  [2004]:	  287).	  
To	  appreciate	  an	  artwork	  as	  art,	  then,	  requires	  an	  assertion	  of	  its	  artistic	  value,	  through	  a	  
process	   of	   interpreting	   what	   the	   artist	   intended	   to	   achieve	   in	   the	   work,	   even	   if	   this	  
achievement	   includes	  the	  eradication	  of	  discursive	  meaning	   itself.	   If	  we	  consider	  Chardin’s	  
still	   lifes,	   for	   instance,	   we	   find	   them	   characterized	   as	   an	   experiment	   in	   «pure	   figurality»	  
(Ogée	  [2000]:432)	  where,	  as	  Condillac	  has	  written,	  «[w]e	  are	  beneath	  the	  passions,	  in	  a	  psy-­‐
chic	  area	  which	  does	  not	  allow	  itself	  to	  be	  spoken»	  (Ogée	  [2000]:	  439).	  	  They	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
genre	  that	  Bryson	  has	  called	  the	  «farthest	  from	  language,	  and	  so	  the	  hardest	  for	  discourse	  
to	   reach»	   (Bryson	   [1989]:	   227).	  Nevertheless,	   to	   appreciate	  Chardin,	  we	  must	  understand	  
his	   achievement.	   The	   paintings	  may	   also	   have	   aesthetic	   value	   –	   they	  may	   be	   beautiful	   or	  
harmonious	  –	  and	  we	  can	  experience	  them	  as	  such.	  	  But	  as	  art	  they	  are	  more	  than	  this:	  they	  
also	  embody	  artistic	  values	  that	  a	  bowl	  of	  peaches	  in	  my	  house	  cannot	  have.	  I	  may	  have	  cer-­‐
tain	  intentions	  as	  I	  arrange	  the	  fruit,	  and	  make	  conscious	  decisions	  about	  the	  bowl	  I	  will	  use	  
or	  where	  I	  will	  place	  it,	  but	  however	  much	  care	  I	  take	  I	  am	  not	  creating	  a	  work	  of	  art	  and	  the	  
finished	  product	  will	  not	  require	  the	  kind	  of	  interpretive	  attention	  an	  artwork	  demands.	  
If	  Stecker’s	  conception	  of	  artistic	  value	   is	  plausible,	  a	  gulf	  opens	  between	  the	  values	  of	  
ordinary	   objects	   and	   those	   of	   art	   –	   and	   between	   how	  we	   understand	   our	   experiences	   of	  
each.	   	   Stecker’s	   conception	   of	   artistic	   value	   arises	   within	   practices	   and	   traditions	   of	   art-­‐
making.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  such	  practice	  or	  tradition,	  the	  object	  in	  question	  is	  not	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  	  
Thus,	  with	   interior	  decoration,	  or	   fruit	   arranging,	  or	   furniture,	  we	  can	  ask	  «are	   these,	   like	  
painting,	  media	  within	  which	  there	  is	  an	  art	  form?»	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  361)	  and	  the	  answer	  is	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no.	  We	  could,	  presumably,	  “cook	  up”	  a	  category	  of	  “furniture	  art”	  (Stecker	  [2012]:	  361)	  but	  
this	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  current	  practices	  and	  norms.	  	  When	  we	  talk	  of	  the	  “art”	  of	  
interior	  decorating,	   it	   is	  an	  honorific	  term:	  unless	  and	  until	  this	  activity	   is	  recognized	  as	  an	  
artistic	  practice,	  it	  will	  perhaps	  have	  aesthetic	  value	  but	  no	  artistic	  value	  as	  art.	  	  Further,	  ar-­‐
tistic	  value	  is	  tied	  to	  meaning,	  and	  art	  appreciation	  to	  its	  interpretation.	  	  If	  we	  return	  to	  Car-­‐
roll’s	  metaphor	  of	   a	   conversation,	   or	   an	   I/Thou	   relationship,	  we	   can	   see	   that	   art	   requires	  
more	   than	   just	  perceptual	   attention	   from	  us,	   and	   that	  we	   in	   turn	  approach	   it	  with	  higher	  
expectations	   than	   those	   of	   visual	   or	   auditory	   pleasure.	   Art,	   Carroll	   notes,	   «is	   obviously	   in	  
part	  a	  matter	  of	  communication»	  and	  we	  bring	  to	  our	  experience	  of	  it	  «our	  ordinary	  human	  
disposition	  to	  understand	  what	  another	  human	  being	  is	  saying	  to	  us»	  (Carroll	  [2004]:	  285).	  
This	  is	  in	  part	  why	  Stecker	  urges	  that	  aesthetic	  satisfaction	  not	  be	  the	  only	  source	  of	  value	  
we	  have	   in	  our	  encounters	  with	  artworks;	   the	  notion	  of	  artistic	  value	   is	  meant	   to	  capture	  
our	   belief	   that	  works	   of	   art	   are	   not	  merely	   objects	   of	   beauty	   or	   grace	   but	   also	   of	   signifi-­‐
cance.	  Whether	  we	   cash	   this	   out	   in	   intentionalist	   or	   non-­‐intentionalist	   terms,	   this	   signifi-­‐
cance	  is	  integral	  to	  how	  we	  mark	  off	  artworks	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  things.	  
With	   this	   (loose)	   notion	   of	   art,	   and	   (non-­‐essentialist)	   conception	   of	   its	   value	   as	   art	   in	  
hand,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  approaching	  an	  everyday	  object	  as	  significant,	  or	  “reading”	  it	  for	  its	  
meaning,	  we	  are	  making	  a	  category	  mistake:	  ordinary	  things	  and	  everyday	  activities	  are	  not	  
artworks	  or	  art	  practices,	  and	  as	  such,	  while	  they	  may	  have	  aesthetic	  value,	  they	  can	  pos-­‐
sess	  no	  artistic	   value.	  Our	  model	   for	   their	   appreciation	   thus	   cannot	  be	   that	  of	  our	  under-­‐
standing	  of	  fine	  art.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  interpreting	  everyday	  objects	  for	  meaning	  is	  
impossible:	  we	   entertain	   ourselves	   by	   “seeing”	   cloud	   formations	   as	   animals,	   for	   instance,	  
and	  one	  could	  indeed	  view	  my	  bowl	  of	  peaches	  as	  a	  meditation	  on	  vanitas,	  as	  perhaps	  Led-­‐
dy’s	   flanêur	  might.	   But	   in	   such	   cases,	   Carroll	   would	   suggest	  we	   are	   being	   «willfully	   silly»	  
(Carroll	  [2004]:	  286)	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  aesthetic	  amusement;	  we	  are	  not	  mistaking	  clouds	  for	  
bona	   fide	  works	   of	   art,	   nor	   are	  we	   asserting	   that	   an	   appropriate	   aesthetic	   experience	   of	  
them	  requires	  such	  interpretation.	  If	  we	  are,	  then	  our	  approach	  to	  these	  ordinary	  phenom-­‐
ena	  is	  deeply	  misguided.	  To	  maintain	  an	  art-­‐centred	  stance,	  the	  weak	  formulation	  must	  ei-­‐
ther	  defend	  these	  kinds	  of	  assertions	  (as	  Leddy	  seems	  to)	  or	  radically	  broaden	  the	  notion	  of	  
“art”	  on	  which	  it	  relies.	  
Stecker’s	   distinction	   between	   aesthetic	   and	   artistic	   value	   presents	   a	   quandary	   for	   the	  
weak	   formulation:	   if	   fine	   art	   is	   not	   to	   be	   the	  model	   for	   the	   appreciation	   of	   the	   ordinary,	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what	   is?	  Without	   it,	   relying	  only	  on	  his	  minimal	  conception	  of	  aesthetic	  experience	  would	  
seem	   to	   render	  our	  experiences	  of	   sofas,	   chairs	  and	   so	  on	   identical	   to	  our	  experiences	  of	  
natural	   beauty	   –	   or	   of	   anything	   that	   is	   not	   art.	   But	   this	   threatens	   to	   trivialize	   the	  move-­‐
ment’s	   original	   goals.	   For	   Everyday	   Aesthetics,	   as	   I	   understand	   it,	   has	   sought	   to	   achieve	  
more	  than	  merely	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  range	  of	  objects	  fit	  for	  our	  attention;	  it	  has	  asserted	  
that	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  appreciate	  the	  mundane	  and	  quo-­‐
tidian,	   that	  merit	   separate	  attention.	   It	   is	  here	   that	   the	  strong	  view	  shows	  some	  promise:	  	  
we	  may	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  there	  currently	   is	  no	  model	   in	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  that	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  adequately	  capture	  the	  aesthetic	  texture	  of	  our	  responses	  to	  the	  ordinary.	  
And	  this	  may	  in	  turn	  indicate	  that	  the	  extraordinarist	  stance	  is	  not	  adequate	  to	  our	  theoreti-­‐
cal	  needs.	  The	  strong	  formulation	  attempts	  to	  consider	  the	  ordinary	  as	  it	  is	  ordinarily	  expe-­‐
rienced,	  and	  if	  it	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  successful,	  a	  look	  at	  its	  failure	  may	  provide	  clues	  for	  what	  
a	  methodology	  of	   the	  ordinary	  actually	   requires.	   I	  will	   take	  Arto	  Haapala’s	  work	  as	   repre-­‐
sentative	  of	  the	  strong	  view	  here.	  	  
3.	  The	  Strong	  Formulation	  
Arto	   Haapala’s	   essay	  On	   the	   Aesthetics	   of	   the	   Everyday:	   Familiarity,	   Strangeness	   and	   the	  
Meaning	  of	  Place	  is	  critical	  not	  only	  of	  the	  art-­‐centred	  model	  but	  of	  the	  weak	  formulation’s	  
general	   stance	   that	   aesthetic	   experience	  must	   be	   somehow	  extraordinary.	   	  What	   he	   calls	  
“strangeness”	   refers	  both	   to	  unfamiliar	   objects	   and	   to	   the	   kinds	  of	   responses	  we	  have	   to	  
things	  in	  general.	  When	  we	  face	  the	  new	  or	  unfamiliar,	  we	  «pay	  special	  attention	  to	  it»,	  and	  
we	  become	  sensitive	  to	  its	  “aesthetic	  potentiality”	  because	  «our	  senses	  are	  more	  alert	  in	  a	  
strange	  milieu»	   than	   at	   home.	   	   In	   our	   attention	   to	   the	   strange	   we	   adopt	   «an	   outsider’s	  
gaze»	  or	  a	  «visitor’s	   curiosity»	   (Haapala	   [2005]:44),	   a	   stance	   that,	   for	   instance,	  we	   find	   in	  
Leddy’s	  notion	  of	  aura	  and	  his	  invocation	  of	  the	  flanêur,	  or	  in	  Irvin’s	  rendering	  of	  mundane	  
activities	  as	  “strangely	  foreign”	  when	  they	  arouse	  our	  attention.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  of	  strangeness,	  Haapala	  attempts	  to	  theorize	  the	  everyday	  as	  
an	  aesthetic	  of	  the	  familiar	  but	  by	  this	  he	  does	  not	  mean	  merely	  paying	  attention	  to	  objects	  
that	  are	  quotidian	  or	  mundane.	  He	  writes,	  «I	  shall	  not	  consider	  aesthetic	  objects	  that	  attract	  
our	  attention	  and	  stand	  out	  in	  our	  normal	  daily	  routines»;	  he	  instead	  seeks	  to	  consider	  «ex-­‐
actly	  the	  opposite	  –	  what	  is	  the	  aesthetic	  relevance	  of	  the	  everyday	  per	  se»	  (Haapala	  [2005]:	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40)?	  He	  develops	   an	  existential	   account	   that	   ties	   familiarity	   to	   the	  notion	  of	  place,	   in	   the	  
sense	  that	  living	  somewhere	  or	  “settling	  down”	  involves	  making	  an	  environment	  jemeinig	  or	  
“one’s	  own”	  (Haapala	   [2005]:	  45).Adopting	  this	   term	  from	  Heidegger,	  Haapala	  argues	  that	  
«placing	  ourselves	  within	  an	  environment»	  is	  the	  process	  of	  “home-­‐building”,	  where	  home	  
is	  «a	  place	  where	  everything	   is	   familiar»	   (Haapala	   [2005]:	  46).	   Even	  a	  work	  of	  art	   can	  be-­‐
come	  familiar	   in	  this	  sense	   if,	   for	   instance,	  that	  Chardin	  has	  hung	  for	  years	  above	  the	  fire-­‐
place,	  and	  a	  quotidian	  object	  such	  as	  a	  bus	  can	  become	  strange	  if	  we	  are	  visiting	  a	  foreign	  
city	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  
Jemeinigkeit	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  human	  existence,	  related	  to	  ideas	  of	  attachment	  and	  
belonging.	  For	  Haapala,	  «it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  live	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  strangeness,	  of	  
not	  creating	  ties,	  of	  not	  getting	  rooted	  to	  any	  degree»	  (Haapala	  [2005]:49)	  because	  home-­‐
building	   is	   central	   to	  being	  human.	   The	   familiar	   in	   this	   regard	   can	  be	   contrasted	  with	   the	  
strange,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  everyday	  versus	  the	  striking	  or	  the	  artistic,	  but	  as	  that	  to	  which	  
we	  are	  attached	  and	  to	  which	  we	  belong,	  compared	  with	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  homelessness	  
or	  alienation.	  
The	  difficulty	  for	  Haapala	  lies	  in	  showing	  how	  his	  project	  is	  specifically	  an	  aesthetic	  one,	  
and	  he	   is	  aware	  of	   the	  problems	  of	   isolating	  the	  aesthetic	  element	  within	  his	   larger	  philo-­‐
sophical	  framework.	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  a	  state	  of	  familiarity	  we	  tend	  to	  lose	  the	  kind	  
of	  “special	  sensitivity”	  that	  aesthetic	  experience	  has	  so	  often	  been	  seen	  to	  require.	  «By	  def-­‐
inition	  there	  is	  less	  distancing,	  less	  possibility	  of	  appreciation»	  (Haapala	  [2005]:	  50)	  because,	  
as	   familiar,	   everyday	   objects	   are	   meant	   to	   pass	   beneath	   our	   direct	   notice.	   He	   invokes	  
Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  tool,	  das	  Zeug,	  to	  highlight	  this	  point.	  A	  tool	  exists	  between	  the	  
user	  and	  its	  purpose,	  and	  «as	  long	  as	  it	  functions	  properly,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  
to	  it»	  (Haapala	  [2005]:49).	  It	  is	  only	  when	  the	  tool	  malfunctions	  that	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  it	  as	  an	  
object,	  inspect	  it,	  and	  consider	  it	  as	  separate	  from	  ourselves.	  	  Until	  and	  unless	  that	  happens,	  
tools	  –	  and	  our	   familiar	  surroundings	   in	  general	  –	  «disappear	   into	  their	   function»	  as	  back-­‐
ground,	  or	  as	  things	  we	  use	  to	  achieve	  our	  everyday	  purposes	  (Haapala	  [2005]:49).	  To	  bring	  
these	  things	  to	  aesthetic	  attention	  seems	  to	  contradict	  the	  point	  of	  Haapala’s	  focus	  on	  the	  
everyday,	  as	  doing	  so	  seems	  to	  require	  that	  we	  first	  render	  them	  “strange”.	  
Nevertheless,	  Haapala	  gestures	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  an	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  familiar.	  «Place»,	  
he	   claims,	   «has	   its	   own	  aesthetics»;	   the	   familiarity	   of	   the	   everyday	   can	   give	   us	   «pleasure	  
through	  a	   kind	  of	   comforting	   stability»	   in	  objects	   and	  activities	   that	   are	   routine	   and	   safe,	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that	  make	  us	  feel	  «homey	  and	  in	  control»	  (Haapala	  [2005]:	  50,	  52).	  We	  «enjoy	  scenes	  famil-­‐
iar	   to	   us	   because	   we	   know	   them	   well	   and	   because	   we	   are	   deeply	   rooted	   in	   them»	  
([2005]:51),	   and	   thus	   our	   appreciation	   is	   precisely	   grounded	   in	   their	   utterly	   ordinary	   and	  
quotidian	  familiarity.	  Beyond	  these	  gestures,	  however,	  Haapala	  can	  only	  define	  the	  aesthet-­‐
ic	  aspect	  of	  the	  everyday	  in	  broadly	  negative	  terms,	  as	  an	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  «lacking»	  or	  of	  
the	  «quiet	   fascination	  of	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  visual,	  auditory	  and	  any	  other	  demands	   from	  
the	   surroundings»	   (Haapala	   [2005]:	   52).	  What	   he	   calls	   to	   our	   attention	   is,	   ironically,	   that	  
which	  commands	  no	  attention	  at	  all.	  
While	  this	  proposal	  counters	  the	  extraordinarist	  view,	  it	  seems	  to	  reduce	  the	  aesthetic	  to	  
some	  kind	  of	  quiet	  pleasure	  we	  feel	  when	  things	  are	  in	  their	  place	  and	  we	  are	  in	  control;	  a	  
gentle	  satisfaction	  that	  “all	  is	  right	  with	  the	  world”	  and	  we	  know	  where	  we	  belong	  in	  it.	  	  But	  
it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  such	  pleasures	  are	  specifically	  aesthetic:	  a	  hot	  bath	  or	  a	  cozy	  seat	  by	  the	  
fire	  also	  provide	  comfort	  and	  security	   in	  the	  way	  Haapala	  intimates,	  and	  these	  feelings	  ac-­‐
company	  a	  large	  number	  of	  our	  bodily	  or	  sensuous	  enjoyments.	  Here	  we	  seem	  to	  concede	  
the	  aesthetic	  to	  an	  ethical-­‐existential	  idea	  of	  place	  that	  provides	  us	  with	  meaning	  and	  iden-­‐
tity.	  	  And	  here	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  attending	  to	  things	  for	  their	  own	  sake,	  or	  asserting	  their	  in-­‐
trinsic	  value,	  but	  prizing	  them	  for	  the	  comfort,	  stability,	  or	  lack	  of	  stimulation	  that	  they	  pro-­‐
vide.	  
What	  is	   interesting	  about	  Haapala’s	  account	  is	  the	  import	  he	  claims	  for	  the	  everyday	  in	  
human	  lives	  at	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  and	  his	  acute	  awareness	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  objects	  
ordinarily	  experienced	  and	  those	  same	  objects	  extraordinarily	  experienced.	  But	  the	  difficul-­‐
ty	  in	  attempting	  to	  theorize	  the	  familiar	  in	  this	  way	  is	  in	  making	  the	  case	  for	  this	  project	  to	  
actually	  be	  an	  aesthetic	  one.	  Haapala	  may	  have	  established	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  everyday	  
but	  he	  has	  not	  provided	  an	  account	  of	  its	  particularly	  aesthetic	  character.	  	  Nevertheless,	  in	  
his	  failure	  lie	  the	  seeds	  of	  a	  proposal	  for	  a	  methodology	  for	  Everyday	  Aesthetics.	  
The	  strong	  formulation	  holds	  that	  the	  everyday	  can	  provide	  paradigm	  instances	  of	  aes-­‐
thetic	   experience	   that	   are	   not	   bound	   by	   the	   conventions	   of	   the	   philosophy	   of	   art	   or	   any	  
other	  extraordinarist	  view.	  To	  manage	  this	  we	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  aesthetic	  elements	  of	  
the	   everyday	   without	   either	   exoticizing	   those	   elements	   or	   subsuming	   them	   within	   some	  
larger	   normative	   framework.	   We	   also	   need	   to	   show	   that	   the	   aesthetics	   of	   the	   everyday	  
need	  not	  separate	  these	  experiences	  from	  the	  flow	  of	  our	  daily	  lives	  and	  concerns.	  	  Haapala	  
is	   surely	   right	   to	   claim	   that	   quotidian	   objects	   and	   activities	   are	  more	   integral	   to	   our	   lives	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than	   the	  “time	  out”	  we	  take	   to	  visit	  art	  galleries	  or	  museums,	  or	   the	   fleeting	  moments	  of	  
natural	  beauty	  that	  come	  to	  us.	  They	  are	  more	  familiar	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  And,	  as	  every	  other	  
element	  of	  our	  lives	  has	  been	  claimed	  to	  have	  an	  aesthetic	  dimension,	  surely	  these	  have	  as	  
well.	  Further,	  he	  is	  correct	  in	  noting	  that	  often	  the	  ordinary	  things	  we	  use	  tend	  to	  blend	  into	  
our	   instrumental	   goals	   and	   concerns.	  Making	   the	   quotidian	  more	   visible	   is,	   in	   part,	   what	  
prompted	  Dowling,	  Irvin	  and	  Leddy	  to	  insist	  on	  viewing	  it	  as	  extraordinary.	  But	  there	  may	  be	  
a	   way	   to	   theorize	   the	   ordinary	   that	  meets	   these	   requirements,	   without	   running	   into	   the	  
problems	  that	  Haapala’s	  conception	  faces.	  I	  will	  conclude	  with	  some	  modest	  suggestions	  for	  
a	  methodology	  of	  the	  everyday.	  
4.	  Towards	  an	  Aesthetics	  of	  the	  Everyday	  
My	  recent	  work	  (Forsey	  [2013])	  focuses	  particularly	  on	  designed	  objects	  rather	  than	  every-­‐
day	  activities,	   yet	   claims	   that	   in	   appreciation	   the	   two	  are	   intertwined.	  While	   the	  ordinary	  
things	  we	   use	   tend	   to	   disappear	   into	   the	   background	   of	   our	   instrumental	   goals	   and	   con-­‐
cerns,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  when	  they	  break	  down	  that	  they	  come	  to	  our	  attention:	  we	  also	  notice	  
things	  when	  they	  work	  extremely	  well,	  when	  they	  perform	  their	  functions	  with	  an	  ease	  or	  
grace	   that	  calls	   for	  our	  appreciation.	  That	  some	  things	  are	  better	   than	  the	  norm	  does	  not	  
make	  them	  strange,	  or	  remove	  them	  from	  the	  everyday	  any	  more	  than	  it	  makes	  them	  hon-­‐
orary	  works	  of	  art:	  they	  remain	  the	  chairs,	  bowls	  and	  coffee-­‐pots	  that	  we	  use	  everyday.	  It	  is	  
simply	  that	  at	  times	  some	  of	  them	  come	  to	  demand	  our	  aesthetic	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  practical	  
or	  ethical	  –	  attention,	  that	  they	  do	  so	  within	  the	  context	  of	  our	  daily	  use	  of	  them,	  and	  they	  
do	  so	  without	  acquiring	  a	  layer	  of	  either	  artistic	  or	  existential	  meaning	  that	  demands	  inter-­‐
pretation.	  	  
The	   factors	   involved	   in	   our	   aesthetic	   appreciation	   of	   the	   everyday	   thus	   run	   a	   line	   be-­‐
tween	  the	  extremes	  of	  the	  weak	  and	  strong	  views.	  For	  one	  thing,	  to	  merit	  my	  approbation,	  
a	  given	  coffee-­‐pot,	  for	  instance,	  must	  perform	  its	  function,	  and	  do	  so	  very	  well.	  	  Were	  it	  to	  
make	  bad	  coffee,	  or	  fail	  altogether,	  it	  would	  indeed	  become	  strange	  but	  not	  in	  a	  meritorious	  
way.	  Fulfilling	  its	  function	  is	  a	  minimal	  requirement	  for	  a	  designed	  object	  to	  be	  a	  candidate	  
for	  aesthetic	  appraisal.	  More	  than	  this,	  to	  appraise	  the	  coffee-­‐pot	  I	  must	  be	  a	  coffee	  drinker.	  
For	  those	  who	  do	  not	  drink	  coffee,	  or	  have	  never	  made	  it,	  the	  pot	  will	  be	  a	  mystifying	  arte-­‐
fact.	  But	  this	  means	  that	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  culturally	  and	  historically	  specific	  knowledge	  is	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required	   for	  me	   to	  make	   this	   judgement:	   the	  coffee-­‐pot	  must	  be	  part	  of	  my	  everyday	   life	  
and	  activities	  rather	  than	  an	  exotic	  phenomenon	  that	  catches	  my	  attention.	  This	  speaks	  to	  
Haapala’s	  notion	  of	  home-­‐building	  in	  that	  the	  coffee-­‐pot	  must	  be	  familiar,	  but	  its	  aesthetic	  
merit	  does	  not	  reside	  merely	  in	  its	  place	  as	  part	  of	  my	  home:	  it	  stands	  out	  as	  exemplary	  be-­‐
cause	  of	   its	   functional	  excellence.	  Standing	  out,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	  pot	  ac-­‐
quires	  the	  patina	  of	  a	  special	  aura:	  its	  aesthetic	  value	  does	  not	  prescind	  from	  its	  nature	  as	  a	  
coffee	  maker	  that	  I	  use	  everyday.	  
Thus	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  replace	  the	  notion	  of	  meaning	  with	  that	  of	  function	  in	  our	  meth-­‐
odology	  of	  the	  everyday:	  an	  ordinary	  object	  does	  not	  need	  interpretation,	  and	  was	  not	  cre-­‐
ated	  to	  communicate	  something	  to	  us.	  But	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  used,	  and	  only	  by	  using	  it	  
and	  assessing	  its	  success	  in	  fulfilling	  its	  function	  can	  we	  make	  an	  aesthetic	  judgement	  of	  its	  
merits.	   The	   replacement	  of	  meaning	  with	   function	   also	   replaces	   an	  extraordinarist	   stance	  
with	  one	  of	  familiarity	  in	  that	  the	  object	  must	  be	  part	  of	  our	  daily	  lives	  and	  routines	  for	  us	  to	  
assess	  it.	  One	  of	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  weak	  view	  is	  that	  the	  ordinary	  elements	  of	  our	  
lives	  are	  uninteresting,	  or	  boring,	  and	  that	  for	  the	  most	  part	  we	  pay	  them	  no	  attention	  un-­‐
less	   and	   until	   they	   come	   to	   stand	   out	   for	   some	   reason.	   	   Haapala’s	   notion	   of	   das	   Zeug	   is	  
equally	  influenced	  by	  this	  view.	  But	  surely	  this	  is	  wrong:	  the	  everyday	  is	  neither	  so	  dull	  –	  nor	  
are	  we	  so	  oblivious	  –	  as	  the	  extraordinarist	  stance	  supposes.	  I	  need	  be	  neither	  flanêur	  nor	  
aesthete	  to	  give	  aesthetic	  care	  and	  attention	  to	  even	  the	  simplest	  of	  activities	  such	  as	  mak-­‐
ing	  coffee	  or	  putting	  peaches	  in	  a	  bowl.	  The	  replacement	  of	  meaning	  with	  function	  also	  al-­‐
lows	   us	   to	   maintain	   one	   part	   of	   Stecker’s	   minimal	   conception	   of	   aesthetic	   experience,	  
where	  we	  attend	  to	  the	  object	   itself,	  and	  where	  our	  assessments	  can	   in	  principle	  be	  com-­‐
municated	   to	   others.	   But	  we	   can	   have	   aesthetic	   experiences	   of	   everyday	   objects	  without	  
separating	  them	  from	  the	   flow	  of	  our	  daily	  activities	  –	   indeed,	   their	  embeddedness	   in	  our	  
lives	   is	   crucial	   for	  our	  aesthetic	  assessment	  of	   them.	  And	  we	  can	  see	  how	  these	  everyday	  
experiences	  differ	   from	  the	  beauty	  of	  nature,	   for	  example,	   in	   that	   they	  are	  contextualized	  
against	  a	  background	  of	  cultural	  knowledge	  and	  use.	  My	  suggestion	  here	  does	  not	  require	  
us	  to	  significantly	  alter	  Stecker’s	  notion	  of	  aesthetic	  value	  as	  that	  which	  we	  attribute	  to	  the	  
objects	   of	   our	   experiences;	  we	   attend	   to	   the	   forms	   and	   qualities	   of	   things	   (but	   not	   their	  
meanings)	  and	  we	  judge	  them	  to	  have	  value,	  producing,	  perhaps,	  a	  distinct	  kind	  of	  pleasure	  
in	  our	  interactions	  with	  them.	  But,	  thanks	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Haapala,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  aesthetic	  
value,	  while	   it	  may	  be	  autonomous	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  being	   intrinsic	   to	   the	  object,	   is	  not	  au-­‐
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tonomous	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  sui	  generis	  because	  it	  only	  arises	  from	  within	  our	  daily	  lives	  
and	  concerns.	  
In	  closing,	  let	  me	  return	  for	  a	  moment	  to	  that	  bowl	  of	  peaches	  on	  my	  dining	  room	  table.	  	  
My	  arrangement	  is	  not	  an	  artistic	  practice;	  its	  achievement	  is	  not	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  Wherein	  lies	  
the	   aesthetic	   dimension	   of	   the	   arranging,	   or	   the	   arrangement	   once	   complete?	   This	   very	  
quotidian	   practice	   has	   nothing	   extraordinary	   about	   it,	   but	   it	   need	   not	   therefore	   go	   unre-­‐
marked	  by	  the	  discipline.	  Consider	  my	  action	  and	  the	  choices	   it	   involves:	  this	  bowl	  or	  that	  
one?	  Peaches	  piled	  high	  or	  laid	  out?	  I	  may	  try	  out	  different	  variations,	  and	  find	  this	  bowl	  too	  
cramped,	  or	  that	  colour	  too	  garish.	  My	  action	  is	  purposive,	  and	  has	  more	  than	  one	  guiding	  
concern.	  There	  are	  practical	   considerations	   such	  as	  utility	   (the	  peaches	  won’t	   ripen	   in	   the	  
fridge;	   I	  don’t	  want	   them	  rolling	  around	  on	   the	  counter)	  and	   functionality	   (they’ll	   rot	   in	  a	  
plastic	  bag).	  There	  may	  be	  other	  normative	  considerations	  too,	  for	  example	  that	  I	  am	  having	  
friends	  over	  and	  want	   the	  house	   to	  be	  welcoming.	   	   In	   the	  end,	   I	  decide	   that	   this	  arrange-­‐
ment,	   here,	   is	   “just	   right”.	   This	   judgement	   has	   an	   important	   aesthetic	   dimension	   that	  
Haapala	  overlooks:	  practical	  and	  other	  considerations	  having	  been	  addressed,	  what	  remains	  
is	  how	  the	  arrangement	   looks	  and	  whether	   it	  pleases	  me.	   	  But	   the	  aesthetic	   judgement	   is	  
not	  distinct	  from	  my	  very	  grounded	  engagement	  (in	  this	  case)	  in	  my	  domestic	  life:	  it	  is	  nei-­‐
ther	  of	  the	  extraordinary	  nor	  of	  the	  lacking,	  and	  my	  conclusion	  of	  “rightness”	  is	  neither	  the	  
assertion	  of	  a	  sui	  generis	  value	  that	  is	   independent	  of	  other	  considerations	  that	  motivated	  
me,	  nor	  primarily	  an	  establishment	  of	   identity	  and	  meaning	  –	  and	  comfort	  –	   in	  my	   life.	  To	  
maintain	  the	  strong	  stance,	  we	  lose	  the	  particularly	  aesthetic	  element	  of	  our	  daily	  lives	  to	  a	  
sense	  of	  belonging;	  to	  maintain	  the	  weak	  stance,	  we	  become	  alienated	  from	  the	  way	  that	  
the	  aesthetic	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  our	  lives	  and	  concerns.	  What	  we	  need	  is	  a	  middle	  road	  
between	   the	   two,	   one	   that	   asserts	   the	   aesthetic	   as	   a	   thread	   that	   runs	   through	   –	   is	   inter-­‐
twined	  with	   –	   other	   judgements,	   other	   actions,	   other	   values	   and	   other	   concerns	   that	   are	  
central	  to	  our	  lives.	  It	  need	  not	  be	  marked	  out	  as	  somehow	  separate	  and	  exotic.	  The	  move-­‐
ment	  of	  Everyday	  Aesthetics	  is	  uniquely	  positioned	  to	  reconceptualize	  the	  aesthetic	  texture	  
of	  our	  daily	   lives,	   if	  we	   can	  but	  move	  beyond	   the	   traditional	  preoccupations	  of	   the	  philo-­‐
sophical	  discipline.	  In	  this	  I	  believe	  lies	  its	  greatest	  promise,	  and	  its	  greatest	  challenge.	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